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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1970, unions succeeded in persuading Congress to pass the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) legislation that delineated minimal standards for safety and health in the workplaces of
the United States. OSHA was enacted by Congress' "to assure so
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe
and healthful working conditions." 2 OSHA did not have the impact
on workplace safety as anticipated, however, and the agency's staff
was reduced, new rules and standards were delayed, civil fines compromised, and criminal prosecutions of the most serious violations

1. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988).
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thwarted. 3 During the 1980's, due to the ineffectiveness of OSHA
in deterring workplace safety violations, several states began to criminally prosecute employers for workplace safety violations under state
criminal statutes. Such state criminal prosecution is the primary focus of this article.
Part two of this article discusses the perceived failure of OSHA
to deter workplace safety violations. Part three of the article focuses
on the shift from prosecution under OSHA to state criminal prosecution of workplace safety. violations. The fourth part examines the
possibility of federal preemption of state criminal prosecution of
health and safety violations in the workplace. Part five discusses
two very recent cases involving the prosecution of defendant corporations and corporate agents for safety violations under state
criminal statutes. Finally, Part six looks at proposed legislation to
expand criminal sanctions under OSHA and also discusses a recent
case that suggests that the federal government may become more
active in the prosecution of willful criminal violations of OSHA
standards.
II.

HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER

OSHA
Finding "that personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work
situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance
to, interstate commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability compensation payments," 4 Congress enacted OSHA in an effort to provide safer and healthier working
conditions for every working man and woman in the nation. OSHA
provides that each employer:
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause

death or serious physical harm to his employees;
(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under
this Act.5

3. Ira Reiner & Jan Chatten Brown, When it is Not an Accident, But a Crime: Prosecutors
Get Tough With OSHA Violations, 17 N. Ky. L. REv. 83 (1989).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 651(a) (1988).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1988).
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OSHA also provides civil and criminal penalties for specific violations of its provisions. Civil penalties may be as high as $70,000
for an employer who willfully or repeatedly violates the requirements
of the Act. 6 In addition, "any employer who fails to correct a violation for which a citation has been issued . . . within the period
permitted for its correction . . . may be assessed a civil penalty of
not more than $7,0007 for each day during which such failure or
violation continues. "8 OSHA further provides criminal sanctions for
any employer who willfully violates any standard or rule of the act
and such violation causes death to any employee. Criminal penalties
range from a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for
not more than six months for first time offenders, to a fine of not
more than $20,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year,
or both, for repeat offenders. 9
Despite the enactment of OSHA and the presence of both civil
and criminal penalties for violations of the standards set forth therein,
the number of workplace-related deaths, injuries and diseases did
not decrease dramatically during the 1970's. The National Safety
Council calculated the number of workplace-related deaths in 1970,
the year before OSHA's effective date, 10 at 13,800,1 and ten years
later, in 1980, at 13,200.12 Although the total number of workers
increased from 1970 to 1980,13 the result was still the same: far too
many workers were killed in workplace-related accidents in the United
States.
More recent figures are just as startling. The National Safety
Council determined the number of work-related deaths, in 1990,

6. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (Supp. 1991).
7. Senate bill 490 was passed by the 101st Congress, increasing maximum penalties sevenfold
so that the maximum for a willful or repeated violation went from $10,000 to $70,000 and from
$1,000 to $7,000 for a serious violation. Henry Reske, Observers Say CriminalSanctionsfor Workplace
Violations Will Remain Rare, 20 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1110 (Nov. 28, 1990).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (Supp. 1991).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (Supp. 1991).
10. OSHA's effective date was December 29, 1970. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988).
11. National Safety Council, Accident Facts, Work Accidental Deaths and Death Rates, All
Industries 1933-1990, 1991 Final Condensed Edition, Aug. 1991, at 37.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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were 10,500,14 time lost in 1990 due to work deaths and injuries

totaled 75 million days,15 and that an additional 100 million days
will be lost in future years from accidents that occurred in 1990.16
In summary, the National Safety Council estimates 7 the total number of work-related deaths from 1971 to 1990 to be 246,900.18
Despite the large number of workplace-related fatalities, federal
prosecution for workplace safety violations under OSHA was minimal, at best. Between 1970 and 1988, OSHA referred only fortytwo cases to federal prosecutors, 9 of which only fourteen were prosecuted.20 In total, the agency has referred only fifty-eight cases2' to
the Justice Department for criminal prosecution during more than
nineteen years of regulation.2 Only ten employers have been con2
victed, and only one employer has actually served time in prison. 1
III.

STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF WORKPLACE SAFETY
VIOLATIONS

Due to the inability of OSHA to sufficiently deter workplace
safety violations, several states during the 1980's took a different
route in an attempt to provide safe work conditions by criminally
prosecuting employers for blatant workplace safety violations.
People v. Warner-Lambert Co. 24
In 1980, prosecutors for the state of New York charged the
Warner-Lambert Company,25 along with specific officers and emA.

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Estimates based on data from the National Center for Health Statistics, state departments
of health, and state industrial commissions. Id.
18. Id.
19. Reiner & Chatten-Brown, supra note 3, at 86.
20. Id.
21. This number reflects the number of referrals up to Feb. 27, 1991. Metzenbaum Files Bill
on OSHA Penalties: DOL Inspector General to Testify at Hearing, 20 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 30,
at 1423 (Feb. 27, 1991) [hereinafter Metzenbaum Files Bill].
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d 660 (N.Y 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031
(1981).
25. For a detailed discussion of the case, see Stephen A. Radin, Corporate CriminalLiability
for Employee-EndangeringActivities, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 39 (1983).
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ployees of the corporation, with six counts of second degree manslaughter as a consequence of the deaths of six employees which
resulted from a massive explosion and fire at Warner-Lambert's
plant. 26 On the day of the explosion, Warner-Lambert was producing
Freshen-Up gum by a process which involved passing hollowed gum
pieces through a bed of magnesium stearate (MS) and into a diecut punch, where the gum was formed into square tablets surrounding a jelly-like center. 27 The process created a dispersal of MS dust
in the air and throughout the immediate area. 28
A heavy concentration of MS dust, suspended in air, poses a
substantial risk of explosion if ignited. 29 Warner Lambert's insurance
carrier had advised Warner-Lambert that the quantity of ambient
MS dust in the Freshen-Up gum production area created a hazardous
condition 0 and recommended the installation of a dust exhaust system and modification of electrical equipment to reduce the hazard
posed by the ambient MS dust.3" Considering this advice, WarnerLambert chose to move toward the eventual elimination of the MS
hazard by modification of the Freshen-Up equipment.3 2 However,
on the day of the explosion, only one Freshen-Up machine had been
modified 33 and a "heavy fog" or mist of MS dust filled the production area.34
The Queens County Supreme Court dismissed the indictment
against Warner-Lambert on the ground "that the evidence before
the Grand Jury was not legally sufficient to establish the offenses
charged or any lesser included offenses. ' 35 The Appellate Division
reversed, but the Court of Appeals overruled the Appellate Division
and dismissed the indictment. The Court of Appeals held that:

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d at 661.
Id. at 662.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 663.
Id.

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 661.
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[a]lIthough there was a broad, undifferentiated risk of an explosion in consequence
of ambient magnesium stearate dust arising from the procedures employed in its
manufacturing operations, the corporate and individual defendants may nonetheless not be held criminally liable, on the theory of either reckless or negligent
conduct, for the deaths of employees occasioned when such an explosion occurred
when the triggering cause thereof was neither forseen nor forseeable.31

B.

37
People v. Film Recovery Systems

Although the New York state prosecutors were unsuccessful in
gaining a conviction in Warner-Lambert, the action spurred prosecutors in other states to bring criminally negligent employers into
the state arena. In 1985, state criminal statutes were used by Illinois
prosecutors in the prosecution of workplace safety violations in Peo8
ple v. Film Recovery Systems.
Film Recovery was involved in the business of extracting silver
from used x-ray and photographic film. 9 The extracting process involved "chipping" the x-ray and photographic film and soaking the
granulated pieces in large barrels containing a solution of sodium
cyanide and wAter. 40The mixture of water and sodium cyanide caused
the silver content of the film to be released. 4' The silver laden solution was then pumped into polyurethane tanks containing stainless
steel plates to which the silver particles adhered. 42 The plates were
then removed from the tanks and the silver particles scraped off.43
On February 10, 1983, Stephen Golab became dizzy and faint
while stirring the contents of one of the polyurethane tanks. 44 He
went to the lunchroom where he began trembling and foaming at
the mouth. 45 Golab eventually lost consciousness and was pronounced dead upon arrival at a local hospital.46
36. Id. at Syl. pt. 1.
37. People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., 1984-85 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 27,356.
38. Id.
39. People of Illinois v. Film Recovery Systems, 550 N.E.2d 1090 (Il1.App. I Dist. 1990), cert.
denied. 553 N.E.2d 400 (1990).
40. Id. at 1092.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Evidence at trial indicated Golab died of acute cyanide toxicity
as a result of inhaling poisonous fumes.47 The warning signs on the
cyanide-filled drums were written in Spanish and English4" and were
of no benefit to the Polish workers, such as Golab, who could not
read or write English or Spanish.49 Workers were never informed

that the solution in the vats was cyanide and could be harmful if
inhaled, 0 nor were they given safety instructions, eye goggles, or
protective clothing. 5'
The Grand Jury charged the individual defendants with murder
and fourteen counts of reckless conduct, stating that "as officers
and high managerial agents of Film Recovery, they had, on February
10, 1983, knowingly created a strong probability of Golab's death. ' 52
Following a bench trial, individual defendants Stephen O'Neil,
Charles Kirschbaum, and Daniel Rodriguez were convicted of murder and fourteen counts of reckless conduct.5 3 The individual defendants each received sentences of twenty-five years imprisonment
for murder and fourteen concurrent one year terms for reckless conduct.5

4

The Appellate Court of Illinois, nearly five years later, reversed
and remanded the case, holding that:
[b]ecause the offenses of murder and reckless conduct require mutually exclusive
mental states, and because we conclude the same evidence of the individual defendants' conduct is used to support both offenses and does not establish, sep-

arately, each of the requisite mental states, we conclude that the convictions are
legally inconsistent."

Despite the Appellate Court's subsequent reversal, Film Recovery
Systems had a lasting impression on the prosecution of workplace
safety violations. As one author has since noted, Mr. Golab's death
47. Id.
48. The warning signs stated the words "poison" and "venemo" meaning poison in Spanish.
People v. Film Recovery Systems, 1984-85 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 27,356.
49. Id.
50. Film Recovery Systems, 550 N.E.2d at 1098.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1092.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1098.
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and the subsequent action "presented a stark contrast between the
weak penalties that are typically imposed by OSHA and those that
could be brought by local prosecutors. 5' 6 In addition, the action
taken by the Illinois state prosecutors has spurred prosecutors in
other states to bring similar actions against defendant corporations
and corporate officials.

IV. TiE PREEMPTION ARGUMENT
The primary defense asserted by most defendant corporations
and corporate officials in response to state criminal prosecution for
workplace safety violations is that Section 18 of OSHA preempts
state criminal prosecution for a work-related death over which OSHA
has jurisdiction, unless such prosecution is part of a state plan which
has been federally approved.57 Section 18 states, in part:
a) Nothing in this Act shall prevent any State agency or court from asserting
jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with
respect to which no standard is in effect under Section 655 of this title.
b) Any State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility for development
and enforcement therein of occupational safety and health standards relating to
any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard
has been promulgated under Section 655 of this title shall submit a State plan
for the development of such standards and their enforcement."

The first argument made by proponents of OSHA preemption
is that Section 18(a) expressly precludes states from asserting authority over any issue for which a federal standard has been established, unless the state obtains approval from OSHA to set up and
enforce its own state plan under Section 18(b).5 9 In response, prosecutors and opponents of OSHA preemption argue that Section
18(a) preserves state jurisdiction over matters for which no federal
standard has been adopted; it does not expressly state that states
do not have any authority over issues for which federal standards

56. Joseph A. Kinney, Foreword:Justice and the Problem of Unsafe Work, 17 N. KY. L. REv.
1, 4 (1989).
57. For an exhaustive discussion of the preemption argument, see Note, Getting Away with
Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal Prosecutionsfor Industrial Accidents, 101
HARV. L. REV. 535 (1987) [hereinafter Getting Away with Murder).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1988).
59. Getting Away With Murder, supra note 57, at 541.
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have been adopted.6 Section 18(b), according to opponents of OSHA
preemption, "extends only to the development and enforcement of
state standards, not to enforcement of generally applicable state
6
criminal laws." 1
Secondly, courts imply preemption if Congress intended to occupy a given field, leaving no room for State regulation. 62 An intent
by Congress to occupy a given field may be illustrated by the comprehensiveness of its legislation. 63 Proponents of OSHA preemption
argue that the comprehensiveness of OSHA demonstrates that Congress intended to occupy the field of occupational health and safety.
Opponents of OSHA preemption, on the other hand, contend that
"[a]lthough OSHA regulations are complex and extensive, they reflect the complexity of the subject matter, not an intent by Congress
to make safety and health regulation an exclusively federal concern."64
65
Finally, preemption arises if state law conflicts with federal law.

Proponents of OSHA preemption contend that state criminal prosecution of health and safety violations in the workplace conflicts
with the administration of OSHA or its goals and purposes. 66 Prosecutors and opponents of OSHA preemption, however, argue that
nothing in the language, structure, or history of OSHA suggests that
state criminal prosecution of workplace safety violations conflicts
with its goals or purposes.6 7 Rather, the prosecution of employers
whose workers are killed because of blatant safety or health violations advances OSHA's stated goal of "assuring so far as possible
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions.''68

Several state courts have recently addressed the issue of OSHA
preemption. In People v. Hegedus,69 for example, the Supreme Court
60. Id.at 542.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983).
See, e.g., R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Dunham County, 479 U.S. 130, 143 (1986).
Getting Away With Murder, supra note 57, at 547.
Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 204.
Getting Away With Murder, supra note 57, at 548.

67. Id. at 549.
68. Id.

69. People v. Hegedus, 443 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1989).
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of Michigan held that prosecution under state criminal statutes was
not preempted by Section 18 of OSHA. In that case, Patrick Hegedus, a supervisor at Jackson Enterprises, was charged with involuntary manslaughter 70 stemming from the death of William
Hatherhill, an employee of Jackson-Enterprises. 7' Hatherhill died of
carbon monoxide poisoning while working in a company van.7 2 The
prosecution alleged that the deteriorated condition of the van's undercarriage and exhaust system permitted exhaust fumes to seep into
73
the van, causing Hatherhill's death.
The circuit court granted the defendant's motion to quash the
information on the ground that the defendant either had no duty
to inspect the van or no duty to remove it from service.7 4 The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the ground that
criminal prosecution was preempted by OSHA. 75 The Michigan Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that the existence of regulations under OSHA governing carbon monoxide
emissions did not preempt state criminal prosecution for involuntary
manslaughter arising out of a worker's death through inhalation of
carbon monoxide. 76 The Supreme Court of Appeals reasoned:
[s]ection 18(a) has the clear effect of actually preserving state jurisdiction over
safety and health issues with respect to which no federal standard exists, while
the language of section 18(b) is expressly limited to the development and enforcement of state standards relating to such issues, and this does not affect the
7
enforcement of a state's general criminal laws.

In addition, the Court noted that the inclusion of a "savings clause"
within OSHA guards against undue restrictions upon state action in
the area of occupational safety and health.78 Section 4 states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect
any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other

70. Id. at 128.
71. Id.

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 129.
75. Id.

76. Id.at 128.
77. Id.at 132.
78. Id.at 134.
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manner the common law or statutory rights, duties or liabilities of employers and
or death of employees
employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases,
9
arising out of, or in the course of, employment2

In a more recent case, Maine v. Moores-Neron, Inc.,8° a Maine
Superior Court ruled that state criminal prosecution for workplace
health and safety violators was not preempted by OSHA.
Moores-Neron, Inc., a contractor in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was indicted on charges stemming from the October 1989 death
of a construction worker on a Maine drawbridge." Moores-Neron
was using a counterweight, a device which serves as a balance when
the draw span of the bridge is used as an elevator for transporting
workers.12 The corporation had originally complied with an OSHA
citation to install a guardrail on the counterweight, but had later
removed the guard for convenience. 3 When a laborer, Todd Dawson, stuck his head out of the elevator, he was crushed by a girder
84
on the bridge.
Moores-Neron argued that OSHA preempted Maine's corporate
manslaughter statute and general manslaughter statute because Maine
was attempting to apply criminal penalties to a field where OSHA
already had established standards enforceable by its own penalties,
both civil and criminal.85
Superior Court Justice G. Arthur Brennan rebuffed the firm's
argument, holding that the Maine law which holds employers accountable for negligence that results in workplace deaths is not preempted by OSHA1 6 Brennan reasoned that "Maine's manslaughter
statute is not criminalizing the violation of OSHA standards, but
rather, it is criminalizing behavior which the state legislature, acting

79. 29 U.S.C. § 653 (1988).
80. Maine v. Moores-Neron, CR 90-581 (Maine Superior Court, York County, Feb. 19, 1991).
81. Prosecution for Workplace Manslaughter Not Preempted by OSHA, Maine Court Rules,
20 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1425 (Feb. 27, 1991).
82. Id. at 1426.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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within its police power, has determined requires punishment for the
'8 7
protection of its citizens."
V.
DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING CONVICTIONS OF DEFENDANT
CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATE OFFICERS IN STATE COURTS

A growing number of state courts, similar to the court in Hegedus, have held that prosecution of workplace safety violations
under state criminal statutes is not preempted by OSHA. Despite
this trend, however, state prosecutors have not been successful in
obtaining major convictions of defendant corporations and corporate officials who knowingly violate safety standards and endanger
the health and safety of their workers. This fact is evidenced by the
decisions in two recent cases, People v. Pymml8 , and People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Co. 89
A.

People v. Pymm 9°

In Pymm, defendants William Pymm, Edward Pymm, Jr., and
Pymm Thermometer Corporation (PTC) were charged with criminal
assault and reckless endangerment for exposing workers at PTC to
mercury. 9t The Pymms were officers92 of PTC, a company engaged
in the business of manufacturing thermometers for clinical use. 93

87. Id.

88. 563 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 3555 (1991).
89. 534 N.E.2d 962 (Ill.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989).
90. 563 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1990).
91. The indictment charged the defendants with 1) conspiring to commit the crime of falsifying
business records in the first degree by hiding from OSHA inspectors the existence of the cellar reclamation projects; 2) falsifying business records in the first degree by preventing the making of a
true entry concerning the existence of the cellar reclamation project and, with intent to defraud,
including the intent to conceal the crime of reckless endangerment, causing the omission thereof in
the business records of an enterprise, namely OSHA; 3) assault in the first degree in that defendants,
in the course of and in furtherance of the commission of a felony, i.e., the crime of falsifying business
records in the first degree, caused serious physical injury to Vidal Rodriguez, a former employee of
PTC; 4) assault in the second degree in that defendants recklessly caused serious physical injury to
Vidal Rodriguez by means of a dangerous instrument, i.e., mercury; and 5) reckless endangerment
in the second degree in that the defendants recklessly engaged in conduct which created a substantial
risk of serious physical injury to the employees of PTC. People v. Pymm, 546 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989), aff'd, 563 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 3555 (1991).
92. People v. Pymm, 563 N.E.2d 1, 2 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 3555 (1991).
93. Id.
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Mercury contamination had been a recurring problem at PTC,
posing a serious health hazard to PTC's employees.9 4 Mercury used
95
in the thermometers readily evaporates into the surrounding air.
Prolonged exposure to this highly toxic mercury vapor can cause
96
permanent damage to the neurological system.
Inspections dating back to the early seventies indicated that PTC
employees were not adequately protected from the hazards of mercury contamination.9 7 Both William and Edward Pymm were advised
of the danger of mercury contamination, and OSHA cited PTC on
at least two separate occasions for hazardous workplace conditions
at the plant. 98

OSHA learned in 1985 that PTC was operating a secret mercury
reclamation business in the plant's basement. 99 Upon inspecting the
basement operation, OSHA discovered "boxes loaded with broken
thermometers piled against the walls with mercury seeping out of
the boxes and leaking out onto the floor."'' 0 The level of mercury
vapor at the time was nearly five times higher than the level allowed
by OSHA.10 One year earlier, in 1984, Vidal Rodriguez, a PTC
employee working in the mercury reclamation operation, was diagnosed as having neurological symptoms consistent with mercury
02
poisoning.
The jury convicted the defendants of the various offenses arising
1 The Kings County
from the hazardous condition of the workplace. 03
Supreme Court set aside the verdict, however, holding that OSHA
preempts New York prosecution of employers for criminal activity
in the workplace. 1 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed, stating that "the goals of State criminal law com94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2-3.

98. Id.at 3.
99. Id.
100. Id.

101. Id.
102. Id.

103. Pymm, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
104. Id.
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plement rather than conflict with OSHA so as to ensure that workers
are adequately protected and that particularly egregious conduct receives appropriate punishment."' 105 The Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that 1) OSHA does not expressly preempt State criminal
prosecution of workplace safety violations'0 and 2) OHSA does not
occupy the field of occupational health and safety so as to impliedly
preempt state criminal prosecution of workplace safety violations.107
The defendants in Pymm appealed the ruling of New York's
highest court to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the
Court of Appeals erred in ruling that OSHA did not preempt state
criminal prosecution of employers for criminal activity in the workplace. However, in February of 1991, the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari on the preemption claim, thus letting stand
the decision of the State Court of Appeals. 0
Upon remand, the New York State Supreme Court for King's
County dismissed the first degree assault charges against William
Pymm and Edward Pymm, Jr., but imposed jail sentences and fines
on the remaining counts of the 1987 jury verdict convicting the defendants of felonies for their role in the unsafe operation of the
clandestine mercury reclamation facility.' 9 William Pymm and Edward Pymm, Jr., were each sentenced to serve weekends in the city
jail for six months and pay a fine of $10,000 on felony charges of
second degree assault and falsifying business records." 0
Justice Thaddeus Owens of the State Supreme Court of Cook
County refused to sentence the Pymms on the first degree assault
charge, which was punishable by a prison sentence ranging from
eighteen months to fifteen years."' Then New York Attorney General Robert Abrams, one of the two joint prosecutors in Pymm,

105. Id. at 876.
106. Pymm, 563 N.E.2d at 6.
107. Id.

108. Pymm v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 958 (1991); Most Serious Charges Dismissed in Pymm
Case: DefendantsHanded Jail Terms on Lesser Counts, 20 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 1743 (May
29, 1991)
109.
110.
111.

[hereinafter Most Serious Charges Dismissed].
Most Serious Charges Dismissed, supra note 108, at 1743.
Id.
Id.
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denounced Justice Owen's sentencing, complaining that Owens, who
originally set aside the jury verdict on the ground that it was preempted by OSHA, "still refuses to adequately punish these convicted
1 2
employers for their serious criminal acts." "
Justice Owens also spurned state pleas to set a national deterrent
by imposing the maximum second-degree assault sentence of twentyeight months to seven years, which would involve serving time in
the state penitentiary rather than the city jail.' In response to Assistant Attorney General Clive Morrick's statement that "the nation
is looking at this case," Owens replied, "You're telling me I'm
supposed to set the standard for the rest of the forty-nine states?
I'm not interested in being a hero. I'm interested in doing the right
thing."'114
B. People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp.15
Illinois prosecutors in People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp.
fared worse than their New York counterparts in a highly publicized
case involving criminal charges for workplace safety violations. In
Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., officials at the Chicago Magnet Wire
Corporation were acquitted of the criminal charge of aggravated
16
battery for intentionally injuring their workers.
Chicago Magnet Wire Corporation was engaged in the business7
of coating wire with various substances and chemical compounds."
Indictments returned in the circuit court charged the defendants with
aggravated battery, alleging that the defendants exposed the employees to toxic substances "with the conscious awareness that a
substantial probability existed that their Acts would cause great bodily harm" in violation of section 12-4(a) of the Criminal Code of
1961 .118 The indictments also alleged that the defendants failed to
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 534 N.E.2d 962 (Il1. 1989).
116. Chicago Magnet Wire Executives Acquitted by State CriminalCourt, 20 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA)

No. 47, at 1655 (May 1, 1991) [hereinafter Chicago Magnet Wire Executives Acquitted).
117. People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962 (111. 1989).
118. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-4(a) (1985); Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d at
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provide safety instructions and adequate safety equipment, provided
inadequate ventilation, and exposed the workers to dangerously
overheated working conditions."19
Over one hundred workers testified at trial that the company
exposed workers to toxic chemicals and failed to equip them with
adequate protective equipment. 20 Witnesses testified that the plant
was often filled with hazy, clouded air, poisoned with such chemicals
as aluminum dust and poly-vinyl chloride.' 12 The prosecution alleged
that the exposure to toxic chemicals and inadequate protective gear
had caused the workers to suffer various respiratory ailments, severe
headaches, and kidney pains. 22 One worker testified that he often
vomited "foam" for hours after working at the plant.'2
The trial court, on the defendant's motion, dismissed the charges,
holding that OSHA preempted the State from prosecuting the defendants for the alleged egregious conduct in the workplace because
the conditions in the workplace were specifically regulated by
OSHA. 124 The Appellate Court affirmed, 121 but the Supreme Court
of Illinois reversed, holding OSHA did not preempt the state from
prosecuting Chicago Magnet Wire Corporation and its officers for
workplace conduct, even though such conduct was regulated by the
occupational health and safety standards promulgated in OSHA.2 6
The Supreme Court of Illinois stated:
[wlhile additional sanctions imposed through state criminal law enforcement for
conduct also governed by OSHA safety standards may incidentally serve as a

regulation for workplace safety, there is nothing in OSHA or its legislative history
to indicate that Congress intended to preempt the enforcement of State criminal
law simply because of its incidental regulatory effect.'1 7

119. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d at 963.
120. Chicago Magnet Wire Executives Acquitted, supra note 116, at 1655.
121. Susan P. Zeller, CorporateDefendantsAcquitted of Criminal Charges in Workers' Injury
Suit, FOR THE DEFENSE, August 1991.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Chicago Magnet Wire Executives Acquitted, supra note 116, at 1655.
Id.
People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 510 N.E.2d 1173 (IlI. App. Ct. 1987).
Id.
Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d at 962.
Id. at 967.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol94/iss4/8

16

Cimino: Criminal Prosecution of Workplace Safety Violations
19921

WORKPLACE SAFETY VIOLATIONS

The Court reasoned that state criminal prosecution of employers
who maintain unsafe and hazardous working conditions will "further OSHA's stated goal of assur[ing] so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions." 1 2 Moreover, the court stated that "state criminal law
can provide valuable and forceful supplement to insure that workers
are more adequately protected and that particularly egregious conduct receives appropriate punishment." 1 29
30
The case was remanded, and following a nine month trial,
Judge Earl Strayhorn of Chicago's Cook County Criminal Court
ruled that while the Chicago Magnet Wire officials may have been
"careless housekeepers," they were not guilty of knowingly or recklessly violating the standards of care dictated by federal OSHA standards.' 3' Judge Strayhorn found that the Chicago Magnet Wire
executives had knowledge of the toxic substances in the plant and
the hazardous working conditions, but ruled that the state failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the workers' illnesses resulted
from the hazardous conditions at the plant. 3 2 In addition, Judge
Strayhorn found no evidence of a conspiracy among the defendant
officials to manage the plant in a manner that would cause great
bodily harm to their employees and no evidence of reckless con-

duct. '33
The decisions handed down in both Chicago Magnet Wire Corp.
and Pymm reveal that although the trend is toward allowing state
prosecution of employer criminal activity in the workplace, state
prosecutors are having great difficulty in obtaining convictions for
egregious conduct on the part of corporate officials. Some legal
observers have noted that rulings such as in Chicago Magnet Wire
Corp. (and similarly in Pymm) could have a chilling effect on the
trend toward more state criminal prosecution of corporate defen-

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 969.
Id.
The trial was the longest in Illinois history.
Zeller, supra note 121.
Chicago Magnet Wire Executives Acquitted, supra note 116 at 1655.

Id.
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dants in these type of workplace-related actions. 3 4 The prosecutors
in both Pymm and Chicago Magnet Wire Corp. expended an enormous amount of time and effort in prosecuting the two cases, only
to achieve disappointing results. Smaller localities may not have the
manpower or financial resources needed to prosecute these difficult
cases.
In addition, observers have noted several other obstacles to state
prosecutions of workplace safety violations. First, the evidence trail
is often cold by the time the prosecutor begins pursuing the investigation. 135 Usually, key witnesses cannot be found, memories fade,
and vital evidence is lost or destroyed. 3 6 Secondly, prosecutors are
often frustrated by their lack of technical expertise in occupational
safety and health law. 37 Many prosecutors simply do not know what
questions to ask or what to look for in conducting their investigations. 38 Finally, the typical overworked prosecutor facing drug
crimes and the like often delay dealing with cases involving work39
place safety violations.
VI.

INCREASED FEDERAL INTEREST IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF
WORKPLACE SAFETY VIOLATIONS

While the rulings in Pymm and Chicago Magnet Wire Corp. may
slow the trend toward more state criminal prosecution of workplace
safety violations, some experts expect that the rulings will encourage
more stringent federal laws and criminal penalties. 40 Some observers
anticipate expanded criminal penalties for violators of occupational
health and safety standards to soon become a reality, as the federal
government faces continued pressure to take a more stringent stand
on workplace-related deaths and injuries. 14 According to Robert
Gombar, head of the environment, health and safety litigation di134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Zeller, supra note 121.
Reske, supra note 7, at 1110.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

140. Zeller, supra note 121.

141. Expanded Sanctions for Job Safety Violaions Likely to be Enacted Soon, Labor Attorney
Says, 20 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1424 (Feb. 27, 1991) [hereinafter Expanded Sanctions].
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vision for the law firm Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, much of the
pressure to increase criminal penalties and "bash OSHA violators"
will likely be heard from organizations representing workers and
victims of unsafe workplaces, such as the Chicago-based National
142
Safe Workplace Institute headed by Joseph A. Kinney.
In addition to increased pressures from organizations such as the
National Safe Workplace Institute, OSHA may find it necessary to
accept a more stringent enforcement strategy in order to keep pace
with other federal agencies, such as the Environmental Protection
Agency, which has been much more aggressive in the application
43
of criminal penalties.
"What underlies all of this is a competition for the attention of
top officers in American business," Gombar said, noting that proponents of stiffer penalties are trying to force top management to
"pay more attention to safety and health and put more money toward safety and health.' 44
A.

Legislative Reform

Illustrative of recent legislative effort for increased criminal penalties is the OSHA Criminal Penalty Reform Act proposed by Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio). 45 The proposed Reform Act
would make willful OSHA violations, causing death or serious bod1 46
ily injury, felonies and increase fines for criminal violations.
The new bill is a bipartisan effort also supported by Senator
James Jeffords (R-Vt.), a member of Metzenbaum's labor subcommittee. 47 "It is fitting that [the bill] is a bipartisan effort because
tough criminal enforcement of occupational health and safety standards is not a matter of politics,"' 48 Metzenbaum stated. "This bill
is about saving the lives and limbs of America's working men and

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.at 1425.
Id.
Metzenbaum Files Bill, supra note 21, at 1423.

Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1992

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 94, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 8
1026

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

women by providing a meaningful deterrent for potential viola49
tors."1
The OSHA Criminal Penalty Reform Act targets only the most
serious violators of workplace health and safety standards: cases in
which an employer's willful violation of OSHA standards causes
death or serious bodily injury to an employee. 150 Under the proposed
Reform Act, maximum prison terms for willful violations resulting
in the death of a worker would be substantially increased.' The
term for a first offense would be increased from the current six
months to ten years and from one year to twenty years for a second
offense. 52 For willful violations that cause serious bodily injury, the
proposed legislation promulgates a maximum prison sentence of five
years for a first-time offender and ten years for a repeat offender. 53
In addition, the proposed bill could increase fines imposed for criminal violations under OSHA by applying the fine schedule of Title
18, United States Code, to OSHA violations, replacing the fine
15 4
schedule contained in OSHA.
According to Metzenbaum, the vast majority of U.S. employers
will not be affected by the Criminal Penalty Reform Act. 155 However, the increased penalties should serve to put on notice the small
fraction of employers who commit willful violations of workplace
health and safety standards. 56 According to Metzenbaum, "[t]he
threat of incarceration will force potential violators to think twice
before deliberately flaunting our basic workplace safety standards.'' 57 Peg Seminario, director of occupational safety and health
for the AFL-CIO, agrees with Metzenbaum, stating that the AFLCIO will also press for expanded criminal sanctions. 5 8 "It is important for OSHA to have the enforcement tools available to take
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Reske, supra note 7, at 1111.
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action when employers' negligent and willful behavior results in serious injury as well as death," she said.5 9 "If you look across the
various laws, OSHA has the weakest of all the criminal penalties .... Expanded criminal sanctions would send a clear message
to employers that willful and negligent behavior is not acceptable." 160
B.

16
United States v. S. A. Healy 1

As aggressive state and local prosecutors continue to bring criminal charges against violators of workplace safety and health standards, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration will find
itself responding to inquiries as to why it is not pursuing more criminal cases. 162 Such repeated inquiries, along with pressure from organizations such as the National Safe Workplace Institute and the
AFL-CIO, could spur more federal prosecution of criminal OSHA
violations in the near future. The Department of Justice's prosecution of criminal willful violations of OSHA in United States v.
S. A. Healy163 illustrates the effect such pressure is having on the
federal government's use of criminal sanctions in cases involving
violations of workplace safety and health standards.
In United States v. S. A. Healy, a Wisconsin jury convicted the
employer of three men who died in a sewage tunnel explosion of
64
causing the deaths by willfully violating three OSHA regulations.'
Two months earlier, S. A. Healy was convicted of state reckless
165
homicide felony charges arising out of the same incident.
The three men were killed by a methane gas explosion in a deep
tunnel being constructed as part of the Milwaukee Metropolitan

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. United States v. S.A. Healy Co., No. 90-CR-123 (E.D. Wis., Feb. 20, 1991).
162. Expanded Sanctions, supra note 141, at 1424.
163. Wisconsin ContractorConvicted in Deaths of Three Workers Who Died in Tunnel Explosion, 20 O.S.H. Rpt. (BNA) No. 38, at 1423 (Feb. 27, 1991) [hereinafter Wisconsin ContractorCon-

victed].
164. Id.
165. ContractorFound Guilty in Wisoncosn of Reckless Homicide in Tunnel Explosion, 20 O.S.H.
Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1203 (Jan. 9, 1991).
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Sewage District's large-scale water pollution abatement program.' 66
The men had gone into the tunnel to inspect methane levels after
a work crew had been evacuated.' 67
Following a three-week trial, the jury found S. A. Healy guilty
of violating three OSHA regulations: 1) failure to install and maintain explosion-proof equipment in a hazardous tunnel location; 2)
failure to shut off power in the presence of specific methane gas
levels; and 3) failure to adequately train employees in recognizing,
controlling, or avoiding hazards.' 68 On March 21, 1991, a Milwaukee
federal district judge entered a fine of $750,000 against S. A. Healy
Co. for violation of the three OSHA regulations. 69 According to
U.S. Attorney Richard Fiore, the verdict and fine "send a message
to the entire construction industry" to meet OSHA regulations. 70
The Department of Justice's success in S. A. Healy suggests that
the federal government will have an enhanced interest in prosecuting
similar cases in the future. As Labor Secretary Lynn Martin stated,
"[t]his very important verdict supports our determination to see job
safety and health standards vigorously enforced, including our increased emphasis on criminal prosecution." ' 7'
VII.

CONCLUSION

The enactment of OSHA by Congress in 1970 did not have the
impact on workplace health and safety as anticipated. Despite the
presence of both civil and criminal penalties for violations of the
health and safety standards established by OSHA, many employers
continue to provide hazardous workplaces for their employees. As
a result, far too many American workers are killed or injured in
workplace-related accidents.
During the 1980's, in order to fill the void created by the ineffectiveness of OSHA, states began to criminally prosecute em-

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 1204.
Id.
Wisconsin Contractor Convicted, supra note 163, at 1423.
Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH), Number 1046, May 14, 1991, at 3.
Wisconsin Contractor Convicted, supra note 163, at 1424.
Id. at 1423.
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ployers for egregious conduct in the workplace under state criminal
statutes. State criminal prosecutions became more common as high
courts in several states ruled that state criminal prosecutions of
workplace safety violations were not preempted by OSHA.
The unfavorable decisions handed down in two recent cases, People v. Pymm and People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp. illustrate
the difficulty states have had in overcoming the procedural barriers
and higher burden of proof present in the prosecution of criminal
activity in the workplace under state criminal statutes. Despite these
difficulties, until the federal government puts more "bite" into job
safety enforcement programs, interest in state criminal prosecution
will continue to increase and will be the primary deterrent of workplace safety violations.
Michael T. Cimino
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